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The concept of Security Sector Reform
(SSR) has become prominent in the last
couple of years, both for local decision-
makers in South-Eastern European coun-
tries and the international community.
Although the academic community has
tried to define the term, the concept is
still fuzzy when it comes to the develop-
ment of the community or the practical
world of policy advisors related to assis-
tance for security. The endeavors of
defining the SSR concept were mostly
theoretic, deductive and normative.
Thus, this study aims at contributing to
the clarification of the SSR concept by
drawing conclusions from the Òbottom
upÓ. It does so by answering both empir-
ically and inductively to the questions of
what the findings of the ten self-assess-
ment papers written by the local experts
mean for Romania and for the interna-
tional community.
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ocratic control over the military, politiza-
tion of the military, de-professionaliza-
tion of the officer corps and insufficient
professionalization of civilian experts.i
The preparation for joining NATO and
NATOÕs assessment teams furthered the
agenda of reform beyond the classical
concept of security sector and comprised
even issues such as human rights, street
children and human trafficking. Most
papers have an institutional approach,
presenting the norms and institutions
involved in SSR, as well as the new sys-
tem of security and defense planning.
From those papers one can draw the con-
clusion that the spotlight of SSR was
human resource management, participa-
tion in peacekeeping operations and
building of a coherent system of planning
in the security area.
The security sector reform issue
facing Romania
The historical legacy has played an
important role as a contextual factor for
reforming the security sector. Problems
generated by the historical heritage have
previously been presented in a systematic
way. It is worth adding that the obsession
with external threats is deeply rooted in
history and inflated by Ceau[escuÕs prop-
aganda and was an important obstacle for
initial SSR efforts. When policy-makers
tried to adopt a strategic concept and
coherent defense planning in the early
1990s, the experts and the public came
up with a whole range of external threats
that required ÒcircularÓ defense and
would have required the whole budget of
1994. For that reason the project was
rejected by Parliament. This historical
legacy has acted not only as an obstacle,
but also as a stimulus. Deeply rooted trust
in the military, corroborated with the
ArmyÕs contribution to overthrowing
Ceau[escuÕs regime generated Òsocial
capitalÓ that allowed leaders to pursue
SSR. 
Other factors that contributed to SSR
could be grouped into international and
internal factors. Among international fac-
tors, the most important included threat
perception and the current international
situation and the role of Western assis-
tance. Since the Warsaw Pact and the
bipolar world formally dissolved in 1991,
the main external threats to RomaniaÕs
security were those generated by regional
conflicts such as those in Transnistria
and the former Yugoslavia. Therefore,
international requirements and assis-
tance were essential in pursuing SSR.ii
NATOÕs Òopen door policyÓ, particularly,
and its PfP acted as an incentive for
reform. They offered advice, guidance
and some resources to pursue a demo-
cratic transition. Later on, the Stability
Pact was the main institution coordinated
by the European Union supporting ÒsoftÓ
security and regional cooperative securi-
ty.
On the other hand, reform started on
the militaryÕs initiative and domestic fac-
tors were fundamental. It was General
Spiroiu, nominated as Minister of
Defense in 1991, who stated that his role
was to prepare the civilian control frame-
work and to hand over the power to a
civilian minister. Economic constraints
and the tight budget contributed to the
ultimate successes or failures of SSR.
Consequently, SSR in Romania has been
influenced by its peculiar historical lega-
cy, by international influence and assis-
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Reforming RomaniaÕs security
sector: progress and problems
The main challenges specific to SSR in
Romania come from its immediate his-
torical legacy. For centuries, Romanians
fought against the Tsarist, Ottoman and
Austro-Hungarian Empires to unite their
territory and to preserve their identity.
This struggle cultivated a public very sen-
sitive to external threats and relatively
supportive of the military. Also,
Ceau[escuÕs dictatorship — the fiercest
among Eastern European states — exer-
cised subjective civilian control of the
military through Party and ÒSecuritateÓ
channels. That partially explains the vio-
lent revolution of 1989, where the Army,
instead of defending the dictatorial
regime, defended the population against
the dictator, contributing to the over-
throw of the Communist regime. Some
Western experts expected the military to
seize power and institute a military dicta-
torship. However, in an unexpected turn
of events, the Army decided to support
the fragile civilian government and trans-
formed its mission and structure and
instituted objective civilian control. A
special group of young officers — the
Action Committee for Democratization of
the Army (CADA) — had an important
role in igniting reform.
On the other hand, it is useful to men-
tion that for about two decades during
the Communist regime, from 1965 to
1980, Romania had very professional
armed forces and intelligence services, a
coherent doctrine of Òthe struggle of the
peopleÓ and a well developed national
defense industry. All of these structures
were integrated in a systematic way.
Thus, the challenge for Romania was how
to build a democratic SSR in an authori-
tarian type.
To sum up, there were four major ele-
ments in the process of reforming the
Romanian security sector. First, the revo-
lution of 1989 disrupted and dismantled
the systemic structures of the authoritari-
an security sector and put the armed
forces and defense in the spotlight of the
reform process. A systematic approach to
security captured the attention of policy-
makers only in the late 1990s. Second, a
tradition of politization of the security
sector, mainly for the intelligence servic-
es and defense industry, was established.
Thirdly, very much related to the previ-
ous issue, the legacy of a powerful presi-
dent who had centralized power and con-
trolled the military added to the popular
expectation that one Òwise manÓ should
be in charge with this. Fourth, there was
the legacy of a strong army, based on
mass conscription. 
Once Romania became a member of
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and
assumed the OSCE Code of Conduct on
Political-Military Aspects of Security
(1994), the goals of reform became more
clear and Western assistance to imple-
ment the reform became instrumental in
assuring its success. However, the
Planning and Review Process (PARP) of
PfP and the program itself did not pro-
vide close supervision of SSR; instead
they focused on defense issues, most par-
ticularly on peacekeeping operations. 
NATOÕs Membership Action Plan
(MAP) after 1999 helped create a consis-
tent, clear and comprehensive approach
to SSR. The new government after 2000
focused the reform process on the other
shortcomings: poor and weakening dem-
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and civilian leaders and younger experts.
Also, independent think tanks and foun-
dations, such as RAND and CUBIC (USA)
and DCAF (Switzerland), offered assis-
tance, organized conferences, debates
and delivered studies. Individual advisers
from the UK, France and Germany
attended the Defense Planning meetings
and helped Romania prepare planning
documents or reports for NATO. Lastly,
civil society organizations prepared many
programs and projects, with assistance
from, among others, the EUÕs PHARE,
the Stability Pact, the PfP Academic
Consortium and OSCE. With respect to
civil society, the Soros Foundation and
other NGOs played an important role in
training and helping the Romanian civil
society.
Security sector reform
priorities in Romania
The security sector reform is not an
end in itself, but a long process which
entails many stages. The first stage of
SSR (1989-1992) began with the de-com-
munization and downsizing of the armed
forces. In the aftermath of the 1989 rev-
olution, some of the first Òrevolutionary
measuresÓ involved the changing of com-
manders and the transfer of the
SecuritateÕs (secret service) control to the
military and the withdrawal of the mili-
tary as a free workforce in the national
economy. The Action Committee for
Democratization of the Army (CADA)
played a key role in initiating changes.
The most notable contribution to the
institutionalization of democratic civilian
control in this period was the establish-
ment of the CountryÕs Supreme Defense
Council (CSAT). CSAT was established as
an agency for coordinating the concep-
tion and executive actions in crisis situa-
tions. The first stage was focused on
debates and social and political anxieties.
In the institutional field, it resulted in the
adoption of RomaniaÕs Constitution,
which clearly stated the democratic prin-
ciples of governing, citizensÕ rights and
liberties, institutions of state power and
regulated/formalized the relations
between them. Another contribution to
the launching of the armyÕs restructuring
and reform was the signing, in 1990, of
the Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty (CFE) that set out to reduce arma-
ments and the size of militaries. 
The second stage, from 1992 to 1997,
witnessed the dismantling of the Warsaw
Pact and RomaniaÕs desire to integrate
into NATO. This, along with NATOÕs pro-
grams of assistance and the conditionali-
ty — inherent to the criteria of joining
NATO — acted as an important factor
influencing the establishment of civilian
control and the ArmyÕs professionaliza-
tion. During this time (in 1992), the
National Defense College was estab-
lished, aiming at preparing civilian
experts in the security field, and a civilian
deputy minister (Ioan Mircea Pa[cu) was
appointed in 1993. Then, a civilian
Minister of Defense (Ambassador
Gheorghe Tinca) was appointed, while a
legal framework for democratic control
and a reorganization of security institu-
tions were adopted. Also in this period,
Romania was the first Eastern European
country to become a member of
Partnership for Peace (PfP), in 1994.
With PfP, interoperability programs and
reforms were adopted (Planning and
Review Process with its objectives of
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tance and by domestic factors. Among
these, the role of internal factors has
been too narrowly studied. It is presented
more implicitly than explicitly and the
role of economic development and public
opinion support has not been addressed
by the papers.
Social implications of security
sector reform
In order to achieve good governance,
civilian control and economic develop-
ment, Romania had to implement tough
reforms and such reforms were made at a
great cost of the society. As argued earli-
er, before 1989 the security sector was
very important, very large and integrated
in a systematic way. But the revolution of
1989 required revolutionary changes.
The first measures of de-communization
and control over the Securitate affected
the intelligence sector. While before
1989 it was only the Securitate (with
three branches) that represented intelli-
gence (and that was taken under military
control later on), six smaller intelligence
agencies were created. In 2002, the
chiefs of SRI and SIE (domestic and for-
eign intelligence agencies) stated that
only 20% of their personnel had worked
under the Communist regime. 
Also, the defense industry was integrat-
ed within the MoD, including procure-
ment. Since the demands of the
Romanian military decreased dramatical-
ly, the defense industry almost collapsed.
Now some factories have been privatized,
and others integrated into the Ministry of
Industry. Most of the workers left the
industry, either due to unemployment or
in search of other jobs. 
The military reduced its size from
320,000 in 1989 to 207,000 in 1999 and
140,000 in 2003, envisioning a further
reduction to 90,000 military and civilians
in 2007.iii According to the same source,
the number of colonels will be reduced
from 2,300 to 630 and the number of
lieutenant-colonels from 5,600 to 1,800
by the end of 2003. After 1997, the
Concept of Human Resource
Management was adopted to deal with
restructuring. The Military Career Guide
was adopted in 2001 to implement a pro-
fessional re-conversion system.
Professional re-conversion comprises
both pre-retirement services and active
measures of social protection. They are
developed with NATOÕs assistance and
the World BankÕs financial support.iv
The role of the
international community
The international community, particu-
larly international organizations such as
NATO, OSCE and EU, has acted as an
important factor in supporting, advising
and directing RomaniaÕs SSR. Some bilat-
eral assistance programs of the US, UK,
France, Germany and Italy have also
played important roles. The requirements
of NATOÕs PfP Framework, the OSCEÕs
Code of Conduct (1994) and the Study on
NATO Enlargement stated clear criteria
on democratization of civil-military rela-
tions and defense reform. They were
focused mostly on Òfirst-generationÓ
issues. Later on, in 1999, the adopted
Membership Action Plan had a compre-
hensive and systematic approach and pro-
duced deeper changes in RomaniaÕs secu-
rity sector.  
Some bilateral programs assured the
training and education for both military
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their attention on adopting norms, initi-
ating constitutional changes that provid-
ed for democratic civilian control of the
armed forces and intelligence. In the mid
and late-nineties, the focus lay on restruc-
turing the military organization and
human resource management. These
reforms were implemented quickly, the
number of troops decreased from
230,000 in 1990 to 207,000 in 1999 and
140,000 in 2003. Currently, the reform
focuses on the efficiency of those institu-
tions. As Mihaela Matei wrote, Romania
was a pioneer among Central and Eastern
European countries in adopting a defense
system, as of 1998.v However, an inte-
grated system of security planning was
created only after 2000.
On the other hand, the re-organization
of intelligence agencies started with the
revolution of 1989. The Parliament,
CSAT and government monitored these
changes. The legislative framework of the
functioning and control of these agencies
was created very early, but the way the
mechanism actually functions is a subject
further to be studied. Later, after
Romania began negotiations with the EU
and the Stability Pact, the spotlight shift-
ed towards other security sectors, such as
the Ministry of the Interior (MI) (border
control, demilitarization of MI, anti-cor-
ruption measures, etc). The initial focus
was laid on the armed forces, as they had
started the ÒrevolutionaryÓ measures on
their own initiative. Moreover, the
prospect of joining NATO with the relat-
ed assistance programs helped focus
attention, resources and know-how on
ways to implement the reform. However,
the declining economy was an obstacle to
successful reform and governments prior-
itized the goals, focusing on downsizing,
restructuring, adopting legal norms and
human resources management. The
asymmetrical focus can also be explained
by the lack of knowledge and focus of the
Western assistance (in fact the concept of
SSR only emerged around the year
2000).
The role of civil society
A democratic society presupposes not
only the separation of powers, but also
the existence of informal mechanisms
and non-governmental institutions,
which indirectly affect civilian control.
Institutions such as an independent press
or NGOs and independent research insti-
tutes (think-tanks), contribute to the dis-
semination of information to civil society
on security issues, thus creating expertise
among civilians. During the Communist
era, in Romania there was no independ-
ent movement or civil society. In our
country, movements such as the
ÒSolidarityÓ in Poland or the Czech
ÒCharter 77Ó could have been created
only with great difficulty.  
According to Michael Sheehan, the role
of NGOs and research institutes after the
end of the Cold War is contributing to the
building of peace and stability, through
recommendations to and lobbying of gov-
ernments, playing the role of democratic
ÒwatchdogsÓ, informing the public about
security issues, and of building transna-
tional networks of cooperation and
research on security issues.vi There are
some organizations and foundations very
active in the field of security policy, such
as Casa NATO — Euro-Atlantic Council
Romania, the Manfred Wrner Euro-
Atlantic Association, the EURISC
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interoperability). Moreover, Romania
assumed the OSCE Code of Conduct,
with a separate chapter dealing with the
civilian control of armed forces (1994).
The third stage, between 1997 and
2000, marks the period when the coali-
tion government of the Democratic
Convention — the Democratic Party and
UDMR came to power. After the failure
of Madrid, when Romania was not invit-
ed to become a NATO member, the
process of reform did not end — on the
contrary, substantial improvements were
made in the field of defense planning and
in the military education system, with the
adoption of the Emergency Decree on
defense planning (1998) and the Concept
of Human Resources (1997). Also, the
security assistance programs have been
intensified and a serious diplomatic
effort has been carried out. An important
determinant at this stage was the
Washington Summit, through which the
preparation of NATO candidates on the
basis of an annual plan (Membership
Action Plan) was proposed.
Unfortunately, at the domestic level,
divergences within the government coali-
tion intensified and the electoral cam-
paign was carried on, which led to the
allotment of fewer financial resources for
army reforms. Up to this stage, the agen-
da of reforms focused on the so-called
Òfirst generation issueÓ, reforms focused
on armed forces, divesting means and
troops, such as border guards or defense
industry to other agencies. Intelligence
agencies, the defense industry and the
Ministry of Interior followed a parallel
track of reforms, albeit at a slower pace.
The last stage began after the elections
in November 2000, when power was
taken over by the Social Democrat Party.
The approaching NATO Summit
(Prague, 2002) and RomaniaÕs expecta-
tions of becoming a full member acted as
important stimuli for a focused effort of
continued reform. To achieve consensus,
on March 31, 2001, President Iliescu
called for a meeting reuniting political
parties, representatives of civil society
and authorities in the city of Snagov, to
sign ÒThe Appeal — Declaration of NATO
2002 ForumÓ. Coherent measures to ful-
fill cycles II and III of the Membership
Action Plan were taken, including
improvement of the framework of civil-
ian democratic control of the army. In
the field of diplomacy, the successful han-
dling of the OSCE presidency and the
organization of the Summit V-10 ÒThe
Spring of New AlliesÓ were important
actions promoting RomaniaÕs regional
role and its image abroad. The Prague
Summit, where Romania was invited to
join NATO, was a turning point for SSR.
The invitation allowed decision-makers to
pursue an accelerated path of reform
with an agenda specific to the second gen-
eration issue — good governance —, effi-
cient institutions, adoption of the
ÒProject Force-2007Ó (a force structure of
90,000 troops and focusing on moderniz-
ing reforms and procurement of NATO-
compatible equipment).
Balanced vs. asymmetric
reform developments
As presented, the early stages of reform
were focused on the armed forces. A
process of de-communization, downsiz-
ing, changing of role, missions and train-
ing system and education were at the top
of the agenda. Early Parliaments focused
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Foundation, and the George C. Marshall
Romania Association. However, the
expertise of these organizations seems to
be limited to organizing conferences and
debates, their overall role in the elabora-
tion of fundamental studies for security
policy being limited.
An important aspect of democratic con-
trol related to civil society activities in the
security sector is the creation of trans-
parency. Together with political institu-
tions of control and NGOs, an independ-
ent press is an important factor in pre-
venting military abuse. Over the years,
the press has acted as a genuine Òwatch-
dogÓ of democracy, being considered as
the fourth power within the state. The
chapters written by Brigadier General
Mihail Ionescu and Liviu Mure[an both
address these issues complementarily.
The former focuses on transparency and
accountability from the point of view of
governmental institutions, the latter
focusing on the role of civil society.vii As
Liviu Mure[an puts it, the adoption of
Law no. 544/2001 on free access to pub-
lic information is fundamental in helping
civil society address the transparency of
decisions in the public administration
field and its implementation is funda-
mental for RomaniaÕs Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration.viii
The role of the
international community
In order to achieve SSR, Romania ben-
efited from many multilateral and bilater-
al assistance programs, both for the mili-
tary and civil society. At the bilateral
level, one of the most important donors
was the United States, through its early
Mil-to-Mil, International Military
Education and Training and Foreign
Military Funding (mostly for procure-
ment). Among the most relevant for SSR
was IMET (later E-IMET), which facilitat-
ed the attendance of Romanian officers
and civilians in short-term and longer
master programs in the US. Another
important project that helped Romania
and some other countries in the region
prepare personnel for PSO was the
British-sponsored Regional Center for
PfP Training in Bucharest, whose cours-
es were attended by more than 1,000 peo-
ple.
At the multilateral level, NATOÕs PfP
program has been a sort of school for
joining NATO, which Romanians regard-
ed as vital for acquiring membership. PfP
helped prepare the Army for PSOs and its
utility was demonstrated by current
Romanian participation in such opera-
tions. PfP also filled the gap of expertise
for civilians and contributed to the pro-
fessionalization of the military through
conferences (organized under the PfP
Academic Consortium aegis), seminars,
courses and trainings at the NATO
Defense College, the Marshall Center for
Security Studies, NATO School (SHAPE),
and through various military exercises
and fellowships. By signing the
ÒFramework DocumentÓ in 1994,
Romania received a roadmap of reform
and additional resources. 
The European Union (EU), initially
under the aegis of the WEU and later
under the Stability Pact, also provided
resources to further facilitate SSR in
Romania. The role of each institution will
be described in detail below. Many
Western-sponsored institutions of region-
al cooperation have been established in
South-Eastern Europe, but still maintain
regional ownership. 
Among them is the South Eastern
Europe Defense Ministerial Process
(SEDM) aimed at contributing to regional
security and stability and enhancing
regional cooperation. The SEDM process
brings together, under the same aegis,
NATO and PfP countries. It provides par-
ticipating nations with the necessary
means to prove that they are evolving
from the status of security consumers to
that of security providers. The ten mem-
bers are: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey
and the US. Since 2001, Ukraine has
been an observer at ministerial meetings.
SEDM built its military structure — the
Multinational Peace Force South Eastern
Europe (MPFSEE) and the South East
European Brigade (SEEBRIG), a multina-
tional regional security structure in
South-Eastern Europe. Croatia, Slovenia
and USA can also be counted as
observers. 
Another important cooperation pro-
gram is the South-East European
Cooperative Initiative (SECI). SECI is not
an assistance program in that it does not
interfere with, but rather complements
existing initiatives. SECI endeavors to
promote closer cooperation among the
governments of the region and to create
new channels of communication among
them. It was launched on the basis of
ÒPoints of Common EU-US
UnderstandingÓ. It attempts to empha-
size and coordinate region-wide planning,
identify necessary follow-ups and missing
links, provide for better involvement of
the private sector in regional economic
and environmental efforts, help create a
regional climate that encourages the
transfer of know-how and greater invest-
ment in the private sector, and assist in
harmonizing trade laws and policies.
Participating states in the SECI include:
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary,
Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey
and, as of December 2000, Serbia and
Montenegro. It is based in Bucharest and
has gained increasing importance and
recognition after the September 11,
2001.
Regional implications
of the security sector reform
Romania defines itself as a bridge
between Central Europe, the Balkans and
the Caucasus. Its strategic vision provides
for the special task of deploying peace-
keeping troops and participating in PSOs
at both regional and global levels. Since
the Balkans were seen as EuropeÕs pow-
der keg and the wars in former
Yugoslavia could have spread instability
in the region, the main measures taken
by South-East European countries and
supported by the international communi-
ty were adopting confidence-building
measures (CBM). 
SSR is one of the most important meas-
ures, as downsizing the armed forces,
restructuring and building common units
contribute to an increased level of trust
and reduce the security dilemma. Several
states in the region built special initia-
tives, such as the South-East Europe
Defense Ministerial (SEDM-1996), in
order to intensify political military coop-
eration with its most important project of
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ManagementÓ. The main goal of the
Concept was to modernize the human
resource management sector in accor-
dance with NATO standards and restruc-
ture the personnel. Two important pro-
posals were the project to create a
Military Career Guide (adopted in 2001)
and the project on Re-Conversion of
Redundant Personnel.xi The necessity of
interoperability with NATO led to the
creation of new institutions, such as the
Regional Center for the Management of
Defense Resources (Bra[ov), the
Regional Center for PfP Training
(Bucharest) and centers for foreign lan-
guage education. The goal of joining
NATO required the Leadership and
Human Resource Department to launch
the Concept on Military and Civilian
Personnel Training for Taking over
Positions in NATO Structures (2002).
The main problem for Eastern Europe
as a whole, including Romania, is the
training and forming of civilian experts
who take over high and middle level posi-
tions in the security sector, according to
the principles of civilian control. The lack
of security expertise among civilians was
generally an important obstacle in build-
ing an efficient mechanism of civilian
control and SSR. An important step was
made in 1992, when the MoD established
the National Defense College in order to
train both military and civilians in strate-
gic and defense issues, two-thirds of the
thirty students being civilians. Until last
year, 266 out of 499 graduates of the
College were civilians who occupied lead-
ership positions in the security sector or
worked as journalists. Another way of
training civilians in defense issues was
through Western assistance in such pro-
grams as IMET (US), the George C.
Marshall Center in Garmisch-
Partenkirchen, the NATO School in
Oberammergau or other schools in the
US, UK, France and Germany. Last year,
special programs on security and defense
(master degrees) were introduced at the
University of Bucharest and National
School for Political and Administrative
Studies.
Monitoring the security
sector reform
Monitoring the reform process is an
issue of vital importance. Many plans and
strategies were designed and developed
over the last thirteen years; many ended
up where they began — on paper. One
advantage for Romania is the fact that the
reform was initiated from within the mil-
itary and supported by the population.
The establishment of the CSAT was an
important step in creating an administra-
tive agency responsible for organizing
and coordinating all activities related to
security and defense. As Romania is a
semi-presidential republic, the ultimate
word on oversight belongs not to the
Parliament, but to the CSAT, chaired by
the President, which has proposed,
advised and supervised most of the
reform measures in the security sector.
Even if the MoD, intelligence agencies or
MI presented reform projects, they were
all equally debated within the CSAT.
Likewise, the ParliamentÕs Committees
for defense, public order and national
security have played an important role in
monitoring the reform measures. 
However, a communication breakdown
among agencies and criticism of a com-
petition between CSCD and the
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Multinational Peace Force in South-
Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) — a brigade
level unit. The Black Sea Naval
Cooperation Task Group (BLACK-
SEAFOR) and SECI Center for
Combating Trans-Border Crime were
other initiatives.ix
The bilateral agreements and units,
such as the Romanian-Hungarian
Battalion were also very important. The
most recent initiative was the Stability
Pact, whose aim is to encourage and
strengthen cooperation between the
countries in the region. All these institu-
tions and networks were created to foster
trust and achieve regional security. It is
important to realize that the networks
and initiatives were created at the sugges-
tion and with the support of the interna-
tional community. Therefore, one must
be aware that the problem is their long-
term sustainability. NATOÕs and the EUÕs
Òopen door policiesÓ might be successful
endeavors; the focus on a coherent SSR
would be also very useful. 
Issues not covered
by the self-assessment studies
Basically, the studies represent huge
documentation and research efforts. For
a country like Romania there is a severe
shortage of studies on civil-military rela-
tions and SSR. However, they exist with-
out clear thesis statements or clearly
drawn conclusions. Many papers present
the laws and institutions of democratic
control very descriptively, but lacking fur-
ther explanatory details. Moreover, the
SSR is a process and each paper should
have regarded reform as a process, not
simply present the current status quo.
The most important shortcoming is the
fact that most of the papers focus on
defense, but do not analyze the reform of
troops, border guards and the defense
industry. Moreover, there is further need
for describing the mechanisms of over-
sight for intelligence agencies.
Systematic aspects
of the self-assessment studies
The SSR issue is vast, but this study
only presented a part of the specific situ-
ation in Romania. The next part will
focus on important topics, such as expert
education, monitoring of SSR, coopera-
tion programs and the types of advisory
boards and panels applicable for SSR.
Expert education is one of the most
important topics of SSR. By experts we
mean professional actors involved in the
process, including military and civilians.
The chapter on military and civilian train-
ing on defense issuesx presents the chang-
ing pattern of education and training for
military and civilians in defense and secu-
rity issues. 
The problem of how to change the mil-
itary education system has been raised
since the early 1990s, when the
Department of Education, Science and
Culture was established. It contributed to
eliminating ideological elements from the
curricula, reorganizing military schools,
and establishing compatibility between
military and civilian education.
In 1995, a ÒConcept on the
Reorganization and Modernization of
Military EducationÓ was adopted, trigger-
ing very fundamental educational
reforms. Further measures were adopted
with assistance from the US, UK, France
and the Netherlands, such as the adop-
tion of the ÒConcept on Human Resource
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Government impeded coherent and
smooth SSR implementation. After the
Washington Summit (1999) adopted the
Membership Action Plan and the issue of
SSR was raised as such, the managing
reform became more complex.
Therefore, a special Inter-Departmental
Commission for NATO Integration was
created in 2000, tasked with coordinat-
ing, in a standardized format, domestic
and overseas activities related to NATO
integration, preparing evaluation reports
on and submitting proposals for the
implementation of the National Strategy
to the Supreme Defense Council. In
February 2001 a National Commission
for RomaniaÕs NATO integration took up
the responsibility and provided new
impetus to the reforms.
On the other hand, Western assistance
grew over the years and the role of advice
and assistance, both multilateral and
bilateral, became very important.
Romania has a lot of programs and for-
eign advisers but does not have a board
or panel to coordinate them in an inte-
grated and effective way.
Conclusion 
RomaniaÕs SSR is now Òlocally-ownedÓ
to a certain extent, but no important
steps could have been achieved without
the role of Western assistance. One
should look at Latin American countries
or the former Soviet countries to see the
difference of outcomes in transitions.
While many projects and programs con-
tributed to (the relative) success of SSR,
including international NGOs such as the
Soros Foundation (which supported civil
societyÕs right to control state institutions
including the military), many ultimately
proved marginally useful to SSR. 
RomaniaÕs invitation to become a
NATO member in November 2002 in
Prague can be considered a major success
not only for the Government but also for
the society as a whole. In fact, over the
last decade, NATO and EU integration
have been the major goals of RomaniaÕs
foreign policy. RomaniaÕs vision of these
two goals does not conflict, as they are
considered to be parallel tracks towards
the same goal — the modernization of
Romania and its anchoring to the West.
Therefore, these two organizations are
the most important for the SSR field.
The EU initially contributed in sup-
porting a broad approach of the reform,
both under the PHARE and WEU pro-
grams. The invitation to start accession
negotiations in 1999 brought a new impe-
tus and broader approach to SSR reform.
Among the thirty-one negotiations chap-
ters, several (such as Justice and Internal
Affairs) and programs (such as PHARE)
are related to the security sector.
However, the most important EU project
remains the Stability Pact, which was
established after the Kosovo crisis in
1999, as a political initiative to encourage
cooperation among South-East European
countries, as well as to streamline assis-
tance efforts. The three Working Tables,
especially the one on the security sector,
with its two sub-tables on Defense and
Security and Justice and Home Affairs,
are the most suitable to coordinate the
efforts of SSR in South-East Europe. The
reform was also assisted by projects such
as the Stability Pact-ISN-DCAF South
Eastern Europe Documentation Network
(www.seedon.org), with its inventory of
initiatives and documents, which have
provided good informative steps towards
a coherent policy in the region. However,
Romania is at a different stage of reform
(one could say a Òsecond-generationÓ
agenda) and the majority of SSR projects
involved the Western Balkans alone, with
some on ÒsoftÓ security involving
Romania. 
NATOÕs open door policy and the PfP
were of utmost importance in Romania.
Although politicians claim that Romania
does not comply with NATO, it was clear
that the focus of reform and allocated
resources were directed towards this end.
Many aspects on the role of Partnership
Work Program (PWP), Planning and
Review Process (PARP) or the
Membership Action Plan in Romania
have been mentioned in the previous
chapters.
Although the OSCE played an impor-
tant role in the democratization of
Romania during the early 1990s, includ-
ing establishing improved inter-ethnic
relations, the most important achieve-
ment was the Code of Conduct on
Political-Military Aspects of Security.
Currently, Romania has ÒgraduatedÓ in
implementing these conditions and legal
frameworks and has a different set of
problems than those other Balkan coun-
tries are now confronted with. Within the
OSCE, Romania played an important
leadership role as Chairman-in-Office of
the Troika in 2001, substantially con-
tributing to the peace process in FYROM. 
Two other important international
institutions marginally involved in SSR
in Romania were the UN and the World
Bank. Romania not only transformed its
involvement in PSOs authorized and
coordinated by the UN Security Council,
but also benefited from the establishment
of a UNDP branch in Romania dedicated
to achieving good governance. The World
Bank has been involved in the project of
re-conversion of the redundant military
both in Romania and Bulgaria.
A striking conclusion drawn by the
Stability PactÕs self-assessment papers is
the overall lack of coordination among
international actors within the area of
security sector reform. Therefore, some
policy recommendations coming from
the shortcomings earlier presented
should be drawn both for Romanian poli-
cy-makers and donors.
Recommendations
for international institutions
Firstly, professionalization of the
armed forces according to NATO stan-
dards and further reform of the Interior
Forces and Intelligence are key priorities.
NATO should continue efforts to monitor
and assess through its MAP process until
Romania is fully integrated (most likely
in 2004). Although NATO has extended
its strategic concept and some transat-
lantic disagreements still exist, NATO
should be in charge mostly with monitor-
ing defense reform and coordinating and
supervising of ÒcollateralÓ reforms in the
area of counter-terrorism, drug traffick-
ing and organized crime.
Secondly, there is a need to establish a
SSR sub-table under the Stability PactÕs
WT III, instead of the two sub-tables.
That will make reforms more coherent.
The issues should be treated differently
for Romania, Slovenia and Bulgaria,
already invited to joined NATO, and the
rest of the countries that are in a differ-
ent stage of reform (first-generation agen-
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da). Besides the Western assistance, the
Òlessons learnedÓ from NATO invitees
and expertise should be transferred to the
other countries.
Thirdly, a Security Sector Reform
Advisory Board should be established, by
transforming the National Commission
for Integration in NATO. The experience
and coordination gained during the MAP
process would be useful. It could be
under the Prime MinisterÕs supervision,
who should report to the CSAT. Within
this commission, a Working Group/Panel
of Foreign Advisers should be established
to avoid duplication and improve coordi-
nation of bilateral and multilateral assis-
tance.
Finally, the analytical capacity of civil
society should be strengthened.
Romanian think tanks lack the expertise
to undertake research, write research
papers and offer policy advice. The
Stability Pact could organize support and
assistance to improve the analytic capaci-
ty of Romanian think tanks and/or uni-
versities. The UNDP and EU could con-
tribute with resources and well-estab-
lished institutions, such as DCAF, could
provide training and advice.
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Introduction
After the end of the Cold War, South-
Eastern European countries have done
tremendous efforts to build market
economies and democratic institutions. An
important issue of their democratization
was considered to be the reform of the
armed forces and democratization of civil-
military relations. Thus, the civilian con-
trol of armed forces and building of demo-
cratic control-mechanisms are seen as
important indicators of democratization. 
However, South-Eastern Europe is an
area where civilizations have clashed over
the centuries, triggering a spillover of the
conflicts in the region. Not long ago, the
Balkan region was called Òthe powder
kegÓ of Europe due to so many local wars
and the ignition of two world wars. The
twentieth century started with the Balkan
Wars and ended with the Kosovo inter-
vention. The perception of South-Eastern
Europe as a problematic and laggard area
produced a runaway policy of eliminating
this labelii.
But in the late 1990s, Western leaders
showed the commitment to put an end to
conflicts in the Balkans and to re-affirm
Marian Zulean
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that NATOÕs doors are open for aspirant
countries willing to embrace Western
democratic values of governance. In
order to assist them and to evaluate their
progress, NATO launched a Membership
Action Plan that requires, among others,
the establishment of a democratic civil-
military pattern. Finally, the reform
process, assisted by the West, led to the
invitation of three South-Eastern Europe
countries — Bulgaria, Romania and
Slovenia — to be NATO members, in
November 2002.
Since a democratic civil-military pat-
tern was an important test for political
developments of aspirant countries, this
study will enable us to track the progress
of these countries in their effort to join
NATO. However, the literature dealing
with civil-military relations, in general,
and Eastern European transitions, in par-
ticular, although extensive, has focused
mostly on the Vishegrad group (Hungary,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Poland). Only a few of them refer to
South-Eastern Europe. There were some
early studies, written by Daniel Nelson,
Ronald Linden, Constantine
Danopoulos, James Gow, or Anton
Bebler but they had a narrow focus,
either on specific issues of civil-military
relations or on a particular country. Over
the last three years, authors such as J.
Callaghan and J. Kuhlman or a group of
British researchers, such as A. Cottey, T.
Edmunds and A. Forester, have coordi-
nated collective research projects on
Eastern Europe, with the help of local
expertsiii. However, none of them repre-
sents a comparative study. This study
aims at filling the gap in understanding
South-East European transition by pro-
viding a comparative study on how
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia succeed-
ed to change civil-military patterns and
on the role of Western assistance in this
process.
The dynamics of civil-military
relations in South-Eastern
Europe
This study considers the democratic
civil-military relations as a complex mech-
anism of democratic control of the army,
of exerting the civilian oversight by the
democratically elected politicians and the
existence of a professional army that
functions as an expert organization for
defending the state. This is an opera-
tional definition, based on the findings of
a collective research endeavor, coordinat-
ed by Cottey, Edmunds and Forester and
in which the author was an active partici-
pant. Starting from this definition, the
study enables us to follow the transition
process regarding two vectors, respective-
ly: 
I. A vector related to society (the set-
ting up of the democratic oversight mech-
anism);
II. A vector related to the professional-
ization of the military institution (how
the armed forces internalized the norms
of democratic control).
The Civilian Democratic
Control (CDC)
This part of the paper describes the set-
ting up of the constitutional and legal
framework of civilian democratic control,
the specific institutions for exerting the
control, and the control mechanisms in
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. 
Bulgaria
a. The legislative framework regarding
the democratic civilian control
The transformation of the Bulgarian
legislative and constitutional framework
began at a slow pace and accelerated after
1997. Between 1989 and 1991, the oppo-
sition has fiercely criticized the armed
forces as being a partisan instrument of
the Socialist Party, continuator of the for-
mer communist party. The adoption of
the Constitution in 1991 set up the dem-
ocratic frame of democratic control,
established the separation of powers and
forbade the ties of armed forces with
political parties. According to the
Constitution, the role of the armed forces
is Òto guarantee the sovereignty, security,
independence and territorial integrity of
BulgariaÓiv. Also, the Constitution estab-
lished the role of the Parliament
(Narodno Sabranie), President, Council
of Ministers and Judiciary in relation
with the military. The legal framework of
democratic control of the armed forces
was completed through organic laws and
other official documents. The Law of
Defense, introduced in 1996 requires the
minister of Defense and deputies to be
civilians and subordinate to the General
Staff. In 1994, a Law of the Consultative
National Security Council established a
consultative body on national security
issues chaired by the Presidentv. The
defense legislation has been improved
after the MAP requirements emerged.
b. Institutions of democratic civilian
controlvi
The National Assembly (Narodno
Sabranie) is the main institution for the
control of the armed forces and other
security sector bodies through its legisla-
tive activity, commissions and defense
budget approval. It not only adopts the
defense legislation, but also has the right
to declare war; it approves the deploy-
ment of troops, ratifies and rejects
treaties, and adopts the Security Concept,
Military Doctrine and other long-term
programs for the military.
The President of Bulgaria is the
Supreme Commander of the armed
forces and the president of the
Consultative Council for National
Security. Also, he oversees the activities
of the secret services and can declare gen-
eral and partial mobilization. While a
martial law is into being, the President
must form Supreme Headquarters, whose
staff assist him in defense matters.
The Council of Ministers (Government)
has the most important power in imple-
menting defense policy. The Minister of
Defense is a civilian politician in charge
with the development of the National
Security Concept, drafting the military
budget, personnel policy and implement-
ing general control over the military. 
Romania
a. The legislative framework regarding
the democratic civil control
RomaniaÕs Constitution stipulates that
the army is exclusively subordinated to
the peopleÕs will, in order to guarantee
the countryÕs sovereignty, independence,
territorial integrity and constitutional
democracy (amendments to the
Constitution were added in 2002). The
Law on national defense completes the
Constitution and defines the fundamen-
tal principles of accomplishing national
defense, the structure of national system
of defense, and the public authoritiesÕ
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activities related to national defense and
safety. Decisions within this agency are
taken by a group of ten persons, led by
the President of Romania. The modifica-
tion of CSATÕs structure reflects the
dynamic of the Òcivil controlÓ. If in 1990
CSAT included only five civilians out of
ten, after 1997 only the chief of the
General Staff is a military officer. The
counselor on security issues, the directors
of the Intelligence Services (SRI and SIE)
are directly subordinated to the President
and the chief of the General Staff is indi-
rectly subordinated to the President, as
the Supreme Commander, while the
other five are ministers, members of the
Government. This fact generates the per-
ception of the existence of Òtwo govern-
mentsÓx. 
The Prime Minister is the vice-presi-
dent of CSAT and chief of the Civil
Protection. On the other side, the prime
minister leads the GovernmentÕs execu-
tive activity and implements the defense
policy, through the mediation of the
Minister of Defense. The General Staff is
part of the Ministry of Defense and sub-
ordinated to the civilian minister of
Defense.
The judicial power, through its various
institutions, has an important role in the
control of the army. The Constitutional
Court is an institution that guarantees
the supremacy of the Constitution and
treats the army as any other institution,
verifying the constitutionality of the nor-
mative documents related to defense.
The Accounting Court is responsible for
controlling the spending of public money
and the PeopleÕs Advocate has an impor-
tant role in defending citizensÕ rights and
liberties. An issue intensely debated at
the beginning of the last decade was that
of maintaining the military court and mil-
itary prosecutors, finalized with the deci-
sion of keeping these institutions.
Slovenia
a. The legislative framework regarding
the democratic civil control
The legislation on civilian control of
armed forces has been put in place imme-
diately after gaining independence and
departure of the last ÒYugoslav militaryÓ
(September 1991). The Slovenian
Constitution, adopted in December
1991, stipulates general defense commit-
ments for citizens and parliamentary con-
trol in execution of defense. Article 124
states a specific Slovenian provision that
SloveniaÕs defense Òstems from peace
policy and the culture of non-violenceÓ
that was included by the ecologistsxi. The
Law of Defense (known as Defense Act
and modified in 1994) clearly establishes
the role of the Parliament in approving
declarations of war or the status of emer-
gency, defines the size and organization
of the Armed Forces. 
b. Institutions of democratic civilian
controlxii
Unlike Romania and Bulgaria,
Slovenia had to start building the military
and political institutions from scratch.
The Parliament (National Assembly)
defines the security policy and exercises
the democratic control over the AF,
through Defense Committee, Committee
on Budget and Finance, Committee for
the Control of Intelligence and the
Committee for Control of the
Achievement of National Security
Resolution. 
The President is the commander-in-
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tasks in the field of defense. There are
many debates and unsolved problems
related to the Emergency decree (ED) no.
1/1999 on the conditions of the state of
siege and the state of emergency, as well
as to the Law no. 39/1990 on CSATÕs
organization and functioning.
After postponements, Emergency
decree no. 1/1999 was adopted in few
hours, under the pressure of the events
generated by the minersÕ revolt of
January 1999. Besides the procedural
aspects, regarding the lack of debate with-
in the Parliament, the Emergency decree
does not fully comply with the constitu-
tional provisions that regulate the excep-
tional states, having a compendious con-
tent, with essential shortcomings regard-
ing the attributions of the bodies
involved in crisis situationsvii. From the
point of view of civil-military relations, it
should be noticed that this decree pro-
vides increased attributions for the mili-
taries. Even if these attributions are dic-
tated by crisis situations, they should be
clearly regulated and framed into a peri-
od of time; otherwise, they would present
a risk for the democratic civil control.  
b. Institutions of democratic civilian
controlviii.
The Parliament issues laws on national
defense, varying from the organization of
the Ministry of Defense and of the armed
forces to the procedures of defense plan-
ning and social protection. The
Parliament exerts its authority by asking
for reports on the military programs and
activities and through the mediation of
its commissions for defense, public
order, and national safety. The role of the
commissions is very important in pro-
moting the laws on national defense and
security, and also in the approval of the
budget.
It also convokes the officials of the gov-
ernment, as well as the minister of
National Defense, to answer to specific
questions regarding RomaniaÕs national
security and approves the defense budg-
ets. The defense expenditures are trans-
parent for the public authorities demo-
cratically elected, including the
Parliament. For exercising an efficient
control, the problems related to the
staffing of the commissions with civilian
professional experts must be solved, but
there are also problems in avoiding the
Legislative by the Executive in order to
promote certain laws. Along the same
line, Ioan Mircea Pa[cu, at that time
(1999) president of the House of
DeputiesÕ Commission for defense of
public order and national safety, saw
three obstacles in perfecting the func-
tioning of the parliamentarian control:
the lack of clear regulations regarding the
relation with other institutions with con-
trol responsibilities, militariesÕ lack of ini-
tiative in reporting to the Parliament,
and the lack of independent expertise of
parliamentarian commissions, being thus
dependent on the governmental agen-
ciesix.
The President of the country represents
the Romanian State and is the guarantor
of the countryÕs independence, unity and
territorial integrity. He is the Supreme
Commander and president of the
CountryÕs Supreme Defense Council
(CSAT), position that confers him a major
influence on issues of national security,
such as: the declaration of the state of
mobilization or of siege. CSAT organizes
and coordinates, in a unitary way, the
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ments to their constituencies. The issue
of transparency in defense matters has
received greater importance in
Southeastern Europe after the adoption
of the Stability Pact. Thus a Budget
Transparency Initiative (BTI) obtained
an endorsement of the Third Working
Table of the Stability Pact, in October
2000, which later constituted an
Academic Working Group in Vienna to
provide guidance for a pilot compilation
of ÒYearbook on South-East European
Defense SpendingÓxiv. Bulgaria, Romania
and Slovenia are implementing the mech-
anisms of PPBS that requires internal
accountability of planning and budgeting. 
Democracy presupposes the separation
of powers. That is why we studied the set-
ting of the legislative framework and pre-
sented the political, legislative, executive
and judicial institutions, which directly
control the armed forces. In spite of all
these, a democratic society presupposes
the existence of some informal mecha-
nisms and of some non-state institutions
for achieving the indirect civil control,
organizations of Òcivil societyÓ.
Institutions such as an independent press
or non-governmental institutions and
independent institutes of research (think-
tanks), contribute to the wide informa-
tion of civil society on issues of security
and create an expertise of civilians.
The watchdog that makes governments
accountable is the civil society and the
media is an instrument of it. Together
with the political institutions of control,
the independent media is an important
obstacle against the armyÕs abuses. Over
these years, the media has acted as a gen-
uine ÒwatchdogÓ of democracy, being
considered the fourth power in state.
As far as civil society is concerned, dur-
ing the communist period there were no
independent movements or civil society
in Southeastern Europe. Movements
such as the PolishÕs ÒSolidarnoskÓ or the
CzechÕs ÒChart 77Ó were difficult to be
created in Romania or Bulgaria. After
1989, we witnessed an explosive emer-
gence of non-governmental organizations
(NGO), most of them being based on
external funding. Many of the local NGOs
have collateral economic objectives, such
as buying foreign cars without custom
duties; however, it is not the aim of this
study to examine the quality and missions
of these institutionsxv. Instead we will
focus on NGOsÕ role in influencing the
security policy and in building democrat-
ic civil-military relations. 
Thus, Michael Sheehan sees the role of
NGOs and research institutes, after the
end of the Cold War, as being that of con-
tributing to the building of peace and sta-
bility, through recommendations and
lobby over the governments, of playing a
role of ÒwatchdogÓ of democracy, of
informing the public opinion on security
issues and of building trans-national net-
works of cooperation and research on
security issuesxvi.
In the last decade there functioned
many non-governmental organizations
concerned with security policy, armyÕs
reform, and civil-military relations; yet,
many of them functioning ad-hoc entered
into self-dissolution as the external fund-
ing of the project ceased, the problem
concerning them was solved or disap-
peared from the public agendaxvii. In spite
of all these, the expertise of these organi-
zations seems to be limited to confer-
ences and debates, their role in the elab-
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chief of the SAF while the Prime-minister
chairs the National Security Council but
has no specific powers in that area. The
Government has the executive role and is
accountable for keeping the unity and
concordance of defense forces according
to national security and defense policy.
The Minister of Defense is a political
civilian appointee and has the key role in
defense policy.
What is specific to the Slovenian case is
the important role played by the
Ombudsman, who is responsible for mon-
itoring and implementing human rights
protection in the defense sector. Also,
beside internal audit of MoD the Court of
Audit of the central government can exer-
cise the financial control of the military.
Mechanisms of democratic
control
Above, it has been presented the set-
ting up of the legal framework for the
democratic civil control and the specific
political institutions in charge with that.
The juridical substantiation of the demo-
cratic civil control of the armed forces
has its origins in the post-communist
Constitutions. According to the post-
Communist Constitutions, all of the three
public powers, executive, legislative and
judiciary, have responsibilities in moni-
toring and overseeing the army. Of all the
forms of democratic control, the
ParliamentÕs role is the most complex
one. 
The most important mechanism of con-
trol is the control of the budgetary allo-
cations, which include planning, budget-
ing, and acquisition system (before 1989,
the military budget was a state secret).
The improvement of this type of control
was delayed due to uncertain provisions
on the increase of GDP and to the impos-
sibility of implementing the multi-annual
budgets, according to NATO standards.
For the Romanian case, another impedi-
ment for implementing the mechanism
of budget control was that of the exis-
tence of the defense industry, with an
extraordinary power inherited from the
communist period and the influence over
the General Staff, the intelligence servic-
es or at political level. However, a new
system of planning, programming, and
budgeting (PPBES) was implemented
after 2001, and the task of the defense
integrated planning was completely
passed under the control of the civilian
minister, through the absorption of the
General StaffÕs Department of Strategic
Planning by the Department of Defense
Integrated Planning, subordinated to the
State Secretary for Defense Policy and
Euro-Atlantic Integration and through
the establishment of the Council of
Defense Planning, under the leadership
of the minister. The defense budget is
public today and subject to internal audit,
as well as to the oversight of other insti-
tutions, such as the Minister of Finance,
parliamentary commissions or Accounts
Courts.
Another important mechanism of dem-
ocratic civilian control is related with to
issue of transparencyxiii. Besides the
mechanism of budget control, trans-
parency (external and domestic) seems to
be the second most important mecha-
nism for the civilian control of the mili-
tary. External transparency refers to the
exchange of information among govern-
ments, while domestic transparency is
related to the accountability of govern-
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fied the BAF among the principle guar-
antors of national security, engaged the
government to place required resources,
stated the civilian control of security sec-
tors and expanded the framework of civil-
military responsibilities outlined earlier
in the Constitution. The Council of
Ministers is in charge of assessing risks,
developing strategies and allocating
resources. It is assisted by the Security
Council, a body comprising, among oth-
ers, the Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs,
Defense, and Interior Ministers, chief of
General Staff. The President could always
participate to the work of the Military
Doctrine Council. The NSC defines the
principles of the Military Doctrine. 
The Military Doctrinexxii extends the
missions of BAF. The deterrence and
defense of the territory missions are com-
plemented by peacekeeping, humanitari-
an as well as search and rescue missions
plus the social functions (creating the
feeling of security for citizens, patriotic
education and strengthening the ethnic
cohesion).
Although Bulgaria doesnÕt have a
defense planning law, the process is done
in a similar way as in Romania. National
Security Concept, Military Strategy and
Military Doctrine are basic documents for
the planning of Defense. A defense
resources planning and management sys-
tem has been successfully introduced in
the past years. In 2000, the Ministry of
Defense undertook the implementation
of the Planning Programming and
Budgeting System (PPBS) compatible
with NATO planning systems and intro-
duced a 6-year cycle of indicative plan-
ning, according to the regularity adopted
in the Alliance. 
Apart from establishing a rational
mechanism for defense resources plan-
ning and management, the system pro-
vides the favorable conditions for an
effective civilian control on the appropri-
ateness of the Defense MinistryÕs budget
spending, and transparency of all activity
undertaken in the Armed Forces sector.
The White Paper on Defense, adopted
in 2001, and the Concept of PPBS
brought some coherence to the criticized
lack of holistic approach to defense plan-
ning. According to the recently adopted
White Paper on Defense of the Republic
of Bulgariaxxiii, the BAFÕs missions are
grouped as such: peacetime contribution
to national security, contribution to glob-
al peace and security and participation to
national defense. The reorganization and
tactics of defense planning are drawn
from the Plan 2004 and Plan 2010 that
will be discussed bellow.
b. The structural change of BAF
The reform of the military structure
was planned through a medium term
plan, Plan 2004, and a long term one,
Plan 2010. The General Staff suggested
and promoted first the Plan 2010 that
was approved by the Kostov
Governement in 1997. After two years,
the MoD initiated an evaluation of the
approach and timetable for Plan 2010, a
working group under the direction of
Deputy Minister Shalamanov with the
methodological assistance of the US MG
Henry Kivenaar and British General Sir
Jeremy Mackenzie. The conclusions were
that the Plan doesnÕt meet the Military
Doctrine model and doesnÕt fit into the
new security environment. Based on that,
the Minister of Defense Ananiev sent a
set of recommendations to the General
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oration of some fundamental studies for
security policy being restricted.
I have described the normative institu-
tional aspects of the establishment of
democratic civil control of Romanian
army. Yet, the democratic control presup-
poses a bi-univocal relation; the other
aspect depends on the armyÕs commit-
ment to fulfill the missions established by
democratically elected politicians, armyÕs
professionalization, and the internaliza-
tion of the norms of civilian control.
The professionalization
of the military
Professionalization of armed forces in
Central and Eastern Europe is an integral
element of the democratization of civil-
military relations and democratization of
society as a whole. A literature review
reveals two approaches to the issue of
professionalization. In the work of Morris
Janowitz, professionalization is a descrip-
tive term for the processes of profession-
al soldiersÕ socializationxviii. In contrast,
the political science approach utilizes
ÔprofessionalizationÕ as a specifically nor-
mative term to describe armed forces,
which fulfill the demands of a legitimate
government in efficient manner.
Marybeth Ulrich also draws an important
distinction between military professional-
ism and democratic military professional-
ism. In view of this study, a professional
army is defined as a military organization
which accepts that its role is to fulfill the
legitimate governmentÕs demands and
which is capable of fulfilling efficiently
the specific military activitiesxix.
Therefore, a professional army carries
out the following characteristics: clearly
defined missions, maintaining a specific
expertise of combat, clear rules regarding
the responsibilities of the army as institu-
tion and those of the soldier, as well as
promotion on the basis of merit. This
chapter describes the transformation of
the role, expertise, structures, training,
and education of the RAF after 1989. We
identified three vectors of the process of
professionalization: 
¥ the changing of the role, missions
and the system of defense planning; 
¥ the restructuring of the military
organization; 
¥ the changes to the system of military
education and training. 
Bulgaria
a. Changing of the role, missions and
defense planning system
Unlike Romania, Bulgaria has been a
very loyal Warsaw Pact ally. The primary
mission of the Bulgarian PeopleÕs Army
(BPA) was the defense of socialism, with
the assigned task of defending the south-
eastern border of WTO. Some Western
thinkers considered that although demo-
cratic transition began in 1989, it was
only after 1997 that political institutions
could be considered operationalxx. The
Constitution of 1991 changed the
supreme mission of BAF to be a Òguaran-
tor the sovereignty, security and inde-
pendence of the countryÓ. By signing the
PfP Framework Document, Bulgaria sig-
naled that it had assumed the democratic
missions for the Army and could orient
towards the West. The new missions and
role of BAF were developed through two
important documents: National Security
Concept and Military Doctrine.
The National Security Concept
(NSC)xxi, adopted in April 1998, identi-
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achieve a professional BAF. During the
first stage (by 2004), the Immediate
Operation units of Rapid Reaction Force
from the Army and parts of Rapid
Reaction Forces of Marine and Air Force
would be filled with professionals. Over
the next stage (by 2010), all Rapid
Reaction Forces would be professional
and the third stage (by 2015) BAF would
be fully professional.
On the other hand, new personnel pol-
icy presupposes the gradual implementa-
tion of the principles of openness, rota-
tion and democracy. A maximum term of
holding the same job for five years and
minimum term of holding the same rank
have been introducedxxviii. A special atten-
tion has been paid to language training
and study abroad. By 2001, 1,543 per-
sons from MoD have been issued certifi-
cates for command of foreign language
following STANAG 6001 and a total of
584 persons have been trained abroadxxix.
Romania
a. Changing of the role, missions and
defense planning system 
In the communist period, Romania
had a relatively well-structured defense
policy, whose main goal was the defense
of the countryÕs territorial borders.
Considering the extended definition of
military professionalism, we could assert
that, for almost two decades, except the
last years of Ceau[escuÕs dictatorship,
Romanian armed forces were profession-
al, but professional in an authoritarian
manner. Of course, the issue of individ-
ual professionalism is debatable. Thus,
the promotion on the basis of merit coex-
isted together with the promotion on
political and nepotism criteria. As a
result, the main task of the political and
military elite after 1989 was to replace
the authoritarian pattern of professional-
ization with a democratic one. Until
1994, when Romania applied for mem-
bership of NATOÕs Partnership for Peace
(PfP), both military and political estab-
lishments had been seeking new strategic
concepts and military doctrines. In 1994,
a National Integrated Security Concept
and Military Doctrine had emerged, but
in practice, both of these were somehow
confuse, identifying a large number of
security risks but with no clear rationale
of how these should be addressed by the
RAF.  As a result, these documents were
not ratified by parliament, and were sent
back to the Ministry of Defense to be
rewritten. Clear and comprehensive secu-
rity concepts and sound mechanisms for
defense planning were in reality not
drafted until 1997. An important role in
the drafting of defense planning concepts
was played by the assistance of the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and United
States (so called Kievenaar Studies).
In accordance with the ÒLaw on
Romanian National Defense PlanningÓ,
the planning of defense is based on polit-
ical and strategic decisions and options
made by the Romanian parliament, pres-
ident and government, as well as other
public institutions that assume security
and national defense responsibilities.
According to the Law, the national values
and interests, the risks and threats to
these values, as well as the main guide-
lines for the provision of Romanian
national security are defined by a presi-
dential document officially presented to
the Parliament — the National Security
Strategy. In order to accomplish the pro-
Staff to prepare Plan 2004 by 1999. The
main goals of Plan 2004 are: to make
BAF adequate for the strategic environ-
ment, have a high level of interoperabili-
ty with NATO, have a potential efficient
contribution to Peace Support
Operations and have a realistic size in
accordance with resourcesxxiv. According
to the White Paper, the Defense of the
Republic of Bulgariaxxv consists of the
General Staff, Land Forces, Air Force,
Navy formations and units under central
subordination.
The General Staff is the basic body that
provides management of the Bulgarian
Armed Forces during peace and wartime.
The activities and functions of the
General Staff provide the Armed ForcesÕ
management and the implementation of
the tasks, laid down in all national secu-
rity and defense documents.
The Land Forces are a basic service in
the Bulgarian Armed Forces. Their prime
function is to guarantee, in interaction
with the other services, the countryÕs sov-
ereignty and independence and protect
its territorial integrity. The Air Force is a
service that contributes to neutralizing
risk factors and actively shaping a favor-
able national security environment. The
NavyÕs function is to guarantee
BulgariaÕs sovereignty in its territorial
waters and, whenever necessary, take
part in operations other than war. The
Navy carries out tasks of guaranteeing
the safety of navigation within the eco-
nomic zone of our countryÕs territorial
waters. 
In compliance with the Military
Doctrine, the troops and units of the
Bulgarian Armed Forces in functional
terms consist of Active Forces and
Reserve Forces. The Active Forces com-
prise the Deployable Forces and In-place
Forces with a peacetime personnel of
34,000. The Reserve Forces comprise the
Augmentation Forces and Territorial
Defense Forces and training bases, with
peacetime personnel up to 11,000. The
Territorial Defense Forces are formations
of Land Forces, set up with the Supreme
High CommandÕs resolution. 
c. Changing the system of education
and training
Bulgarian policy makers were aware of
the problems of human resources man-
agement and a new system of education
very early but, over the early 1990s,
efforts were made to streamline the AF
and reconversion. A Concept   for training
of the military personnel for Defense has
been adopted late in 2000. 
According to that Concept, military
education of officers is organized on
three levels: the first level is at the
National Military University (comprising
4 colleges), the second level is carried out
at the Faculty of Interoperability at the
ÒRakovskiÓ Military Academy and the
third one takes place at the same military
academy, National Security Department
(for strategic level officers)xxvi. 
The education of enlisted sergeants is
done in the first year by training in spe-
cial centers. Selection is made from
enlisted soldiers, civilian employees and
conscripts who passed two thirds of
mandatory service. In September 2000,
the Minister of Defense passed the order
ÒMain trends for professionalization of
BAFÓxxvii, which contains a promoting
campaign for enlistment, measures to
improve the selection of candidates and
outlined the priorities and stages to
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visions of the National Security Strategy,
the government elaborates the White
Paper of Defense, establishing the goals,
tasks and budget of the security and
defense institutions. After this, each min-
istry or public institution with defense
and security related tasks has to prepare
its own departmental plan, program or
strategy according to the governing pro-
gram and White Paper provisions. At the
level of departmental strategies, the
Ministry of National Defense, as the
authority responsible for the military
defense of the country, produces the
Military Strategy, while the Romanian
Interior Ministry and Intelligence
Services prepare their own strategies
according to their own responsibilities.
The first document, ÒNational Security
Strategy of RomaniaÓ, was approved by
the CountryÕs Supreme Defense Council
(CSAT) in June 1999. In December
2001, President Iliescu presented to the
Parliament the new ÒNational Security
Strategy of RomaniaÓxxx, which proposes a
more clear vision on the security frame-
work and on RomaniaÕs strategic goals,
defines the national interests and estab-
lishes the main directions of action for
ensuring security. This time, the new
strategy identifies both risk factors and
vulnerabilities of the domestic life and
establishes clear directions of action in
the political, administrative, economic,
social, educational, national safety,
national defense or external policy field. 
According to the provisions of the
National Defense Planning Law No.
63/2000, the Ministry of National
Defense implemented a new planning,
programming, evaluation and budgeting
system (PPBES), since 2002 (tested in
2000 and 2001). The core of this new sys-
tem is an integrated conception of
human, material and financial resources
planning and management, which will
improve the capability of the AF to fulfill
its operational criteria. The framework of
democratic control offers the civilian
leadership the opportunity to set goals for
the armed forces — and for a restructured
military to prove that is able to accom-
plish the tasks. Indeed, a Pentagon offi-
cial observed that ÒÉthe Directive of
Defense Planning is one of the best in
Eastern EuropeÓ, but that ÒÉit isnÕt com-
pletely implementedÓ.xxxi
b. The restructuring of the military
organization
The main goal of the structural reforms
of the RAF has been to create a compact,
flexible NATO-compatible military,
which is able to adequately provide for
the security of the Romanian people. The
reform process was, initially, triggered by
the requirements of the 1989 revolution
and by the signing of Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 1990.
As a result, in November 1990 the RAF
reduced its tank strength from 2,850 to
1,375, its armored vehicle strength from
3,102 to 2,100, its artillery from 3,789 to
1,475 pieces, and its aircraft from 505 to
430. The RAFs initial stage of reform
lasted until 1992, and should be under-
stood primarily as a period of de-commu-
nization. A more organized and coherent
series of reforms were begun in 1993,
leading to the approval of a new structure
for the Ministry of National Defense in
1994. The later ÒArmy 2000Ó is a docu-
ment, which explored ways to improve
the quality of Romanian military struc-
tures. The Romanian Ministry of
National Defense was fully reorganized in
May 1997 — with changes affecting both
central structures and combat forces.
These changes were conducted under
PfPÕs Planning and Review Process
(PARP) with the aim of increasing NATO
interoperability. 
One of the first measures taken by the
newly elected government in January
2001 was to adopt the ÒOrdinance for
Organization and Functioning of the
Ministry of National DefenseÓ. According
to this law, the RAF is directed by a
General Staff and consists of three
Services: Land Forces, Air and Air
Defense Forces and Naval Forces. They
are organized into Operational Forces
and Territorial Forces. 
The direct management of these forces
is the responsibility of the General Staff.
The Chief of the General Staff is also the
Chief of Defense, and RomaniaÕs senior
military officer. The General Staff itself
has recently been reorganized with
ÒjointÓ directorates similar to those in
NATO and United States staffs. The
General Staff has recently published a
medium term planning document called
Strategic Vision 2010 in relation to the
future structure of the RAF. This envis-
ages a major shift towards all volunteer
forces by 2005 (70 per cent compared to
the present 47 per cent). Moreover, as
part of the second cycle of NATOÕs
Membership Action Plan (MAP),
Romania aims to reduce the size of its
military to a peacetime strength of
112,000, and a wartime strength of
230,000 (fully mobilized).
c. Changing the system of education
and training
Education and training is a central part
of any process of professionalization. The
first step in this process was introduced
in 1995 in the form of the Concept of
Reforming Military Education. The goal
of the concept is the development of pro-
fessional military personnel and the train-
ing of students at specifically military
educational institutions. The basic insti-
tutions for military education include
military high schools, post-high school
education for warrant officers and NCOs,
higher education for command officers
(three military academies), technical edu-
cation, command and staff training, a
training system for experts, a Regional
Center for PfP Training, a Regional
Center for the Management of Defense
Resources and centers for Foreign
Languages education. 
The Concept of Human Resource
Management was initially elaborated in
1997. It was later completed with British,
Dutch and US assistance, and established
a National Defense Framework Action
Plan for 2000-2003 and a Long Term
Framework (to 2010). The plans identi-
fied three options for the ultimate size of
the RAF, ranging from 87,000 to
140,000. The middle option of 112,000
servicemen and 28,000 civilians was
identified as the ideal size for RomaniaÕs
national defense system, with a deadline
of 2003 set for reaching this goal. This
downsizing will form the first phase of
RomaniaÕs military reform process. In
phase two — between 2004 and 2007 —
further reforms will concentrate on the
modernization of equipment, and the
development of full interoperability with
NATO. The Concept of Human Resource
Management also provides for the stream-
lining of the RAFs top-heavy officer corps
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1999. Guidelines to organization of
defense and long-term development and
equipping programs are determined by the
National Assembly (annually) and
reviewed by the defense committees.
According to planning methodology, there
are 3 planning periods: long term (for 10
years), short term (5 years) and fiscal year.
The General Staff of SAF is in charge with
force planning. 
b. Changing the structure
The structure of SAF evolved from the
Territorial Defense (police type) to a stand-
ing army. The Military Defense Strategy
(1998) took into account the interoper-
ability with NATO and envisaged force
restructuring by 2010 into Rapid Reaction
Forces, Main Defense Forces and Support
Defense Force. The General Staff is fully
integrated into MoD and the chief of
Defense is accountable to the Minister.
The Main Defense Force is the largest part
of the SAF.
According to the recent document ÒSize
and Structure of SAF 2010Ó, the total of
wartime strength is 76,000, being reduced
to 47,000 in 2001, of which only 6% are
professionalxxxiii. In 2000 there were 4,926
professional militaries and 3,368 con-
scriptsxxxiv.
c. System of educationand training
After independence, Slovenia decided
to adopt a civilian oriented education sys-
tem rather than classical military acade-
mies. The military knowledge and train-
ing is carried out later through short-term
courses or one-year military professional-
ization. The professional military educa-
tion is carried out in the Military
Education Center of the MoD that com-
prises Officer Training School, NCO
Training School, Command and Staff
School, Mountain School and Foreign
Languages. The civilian defense experts
are trained at the University of Ljubljana,
Defense Study program. As for the train-
ing of conscripts, of 227 days of military
service, only 110 are spent for opera-
tional training so Òmost conscripts were
inadequately trained with low level of fit-
ness and motivationÉÓxxxv. Generally
speaking, between 1991 and 1999 there
was a shortage of manpower and an inap-
propriate human resource policy (lack of
clear promotion criteria, shortage of man-
power etc).
In conclusion, it can be stated from the
comparative analysis presented above that
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia started
the process of democratization of civil-mil-
itary patterns following different paths
but achieving similar pattern, common to
NATOÕs countries. If the reform started in
Bulgaria through a top-down decision, in
Romania through a bloody revolution, in
Slovenia through a bloodless break-up
from the federal state of Yugoslavia.
There were the internal forces that ignit-
ed the reform and supported it, but the
Western assistance and financial support
was fundamental in drawing the plans, in
clarifying the goals and making the pat-
terns interoperable with the Western one.
Next, we will describe the role of Western
assistance in building democratic civil-mil-
itary relations.
The role of Western assistance
Although there were no specific ªcivil-
military programsÓ of assistance, they
were incorporated within other pro-
grams. The assistance programs were pur-
sued either at multilateral or bilateral lev-
els. Besides the assistance programs, the
— a structural legacy from the communist
period. The current 30,000 strong officer
corps will be halved, with the number of
colonels reduced from 2,300 to 630, the
number of lieutenant colonels from
5,600 to 1,800 and the number of Majors
from 7,800 to 2,200. This will create an
officer to NCO ratio of 1/3. As a result of
these reforms, 11,000 officers and war-
rant officers left the RAF in 1998. 94 per
cent of these took voluntary retirement,
and 85 per cent of them were drawn from
the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel
and colonel. Two other important initia-
tives for the reform of the RAF include
the Military Career Guide and
Professional Reconversion. The Career
Guide, which has been applicable from
June 2001, is an important framework
for the whole process of professionaliza-
tion of RAF, according to its new mis-
sions and roles. Promotion is now a trans-
parent process and is based on clear
rules. Professional Reconversion is of fun-
damental importance in the context of
the halving of the officer corps. The main
measures here include the provision of
social protection for officers who leave
the army, as well as assistance and train-
ing to help them find a civilian career.
The need for interoperability with
NATO in the framework of PfP has also
established new goals and strategies for
the reform of the RAF. PARP, for exam-
ple, has provided a structured approach
for developing the interoperability of the
RAF with NATO Allies. Subsequently,
the MAP has helped push Romanian mil-
itary reform towards the Power
Projection goal. In the field of education,
centers for foreign languages training,
peacekeeping, and defense planning
training have also been established.
Moreover, more than 1500 Romanian
officers have attended courses in NATO
member countries.
Slovenia
a. Changing the role and missions of
SAF
Slovenians have had to build their army
from scratch since they gained independ-
ence in 1991, on the ashes of Territorial
Defense Forces of the former Yugoslavia.
Territorial Defense units contributed
essentially to the gaining of independence
so, it fulfilled the role of a standing army
by 1994, when this was transformed in the
Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF). The basic
principles and roles of SAF are deter-
mined by the Constitution, the Resolution
on the National Security, the Military
Defense Doctrine (1995), the Military
Defense Strategy (1998) and the National
Strategy for Integration into NATO
(1998). 
According to the Defense Law (1994),
the fundamental tasks of the SAF are: to
carry out the military training, to assure
combat readiness, to defend the country in
case of attack, to cooperate in civil protec-
tion and disaster relief and to carry out the
responsibilities of international organiza-
tionsxxxii. 
The official document ÒFacts about
Slovenia-Defense SystemÓ states that the
defense system is comprised of comple-
mentary military and civil defense. While
the military role is carried out by SAF, the
civil defense is a unified system of meas-
ures and activities that support military
defense.
A coherent and operational system of
defense planning was put in place after
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some bilateral assistance programs of
individual EU countries were very helpful
in building democratic civil-military pat-
terns.
The Role of Bilateral Assistance
Although countries such as U.K.,
Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Turkey and Greece were very supportive
of Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, by far
the most important donor were the
United States.
US bilateral assistance was delivered
both for the development of civil society
and for the military reform. In the field of
civil society development, USAID was the
most important provider of funds
through its Global BureauÕs Center for
Democracy and Governance, promoting
democratization of CMR, demobilization
and reintegration of the militaries. It
managed the Congressional funds under
Supporting East European Democracies
Act (SEED). Nongovernmental organiza-
tions such as National Endowment for
Democracy, National Democratic
Institute or International Republican
Institute were also involved in civil socie-
ty capacity building.
In the field of military reform, the
Pentagon runs important programs such
as Mil-to-Mil, the Warsaw Initiative and
International Military Education and
Training (IMET). The last one was impor-
tant because it supported military person-
nel to come to US military schools and
face first-hand not only exposure on mili-
tary professionalism but also understand
the role of the military in a democracy.
According to some Pentagon info,
between 1993-2003, Romanian military
received more than 79 million USD and
recently received 11,5 million USD
under the Freedom Consolidation Act.
At a different level, a special role in
assisting the SEE countries with a lobby
in U.S. was played by the US Committee
on NATO, an influential bipartisan
American NGO, established after the
Madrid decision in order to help Clinton
Administration pass the ratification of
the admission protocols for Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland. After
2001, US Committee on NATO, under
Bruce JacksonÕs leadership was very
active, very skillful and influential in
bringing the V10 countries close to trans-
Atlantic structures and in inviting
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia to
NATO. As ÒCongressional QuarterlyÓ
acknowledged, Ò...these political allies
offer applicant governments advice on
whom to see and how to present their
case...Óxxxvi.
Besides the American and some indi-
vidual European countriesÕ help, a spe-
cial role in supporting the invitation of
Romania and Bulgaria in NATO has been
played by the so-called Ò2+2Ó, mecha-
nism, an informal cooperation mecha-
nism of Bulgaria and Romania with
Greece and Turkey.
Transatlantic Rift? Mars
and Venus debate about
the satellites
By the end of 2002, the peoples of SEE
countries saw their integration into
NATO and EU as an intertwined process
or two different faces of a similar process,
integration into the West. If the public
perceived NATO accession as driven by
security reasons, EU integration was
mostly seen as a transformation process
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new security environment after
September 11, 2001 created new inter-
ests and boosted the preparation and
lobby for integration of SEE countries
within Western institutions. This part of
the study will briefly describe the role of
Western assistance, on both multilateral
and bilateral levels.
Multilateral Assistance
The United Nations, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(through its Code of Conduct) and the
European Union were institutions
involved in supporting the transforma-
tion and democratization of CEE, and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) was the most active and influen-
tial.
The Role of NATO and Partnership
for Peace
NATO has been the main multilateral
organization able and interested to pro-
mote a democratic civil-military pattern.
It acted more like a ÒcarrotÓ for SEE
countries in search of integration to a
more prosperous Western world. The
Study of NATO Enlargement (1995)
openly claimed that its goal is to support
democratic reforms in CEE, including
the democratic control of Armed Forces
and set some indicators for the countries
willing to join NATO.
Aware of the lack of civilian expertise,
NATO ran a large number of activities to
develop civilian expertise on security.
NATO has strengthened its information
programs for partners including confer-
ences and seminars, (including at the
NATO Defense College and at the NATO
School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau) visit
programs, fellowships, etc. NATO was
and still is making another long-term
investment in European stability through
its ongoing enlargement process. The
main instrument of NATO assistance to
SEE has been the Partnership for Peace
(PfP). Its main goals were to expand and
intensify political and military coopera-
tion throughout Europe, increase stabili-
ty, diminish threats to peace, and build
strengthened relationships by promoting
the spirit of practical cooperation and
commitment to democratic principles
that underpin the Alliance. In the sense
of a clear roadmap for reform,
Membership Action Plan (MAP) was
essential for Slovenia, Romania and
Bulgaria. 
If NATO had a clear-cut goal in sup-
porting democratization of civil-military
relations in SEE, mostly as a condition
for accession to its structure (see the
ÒStudy of NATO EnlargementÓ), the
European Union has had a different role
in that process. After the Kosovo crisis,
the EU has committed to solving the
Balkans problems and has launched the
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
at Cologne, on June 10, 1999.  The
Stability Pact aims at strengthening coun-
tries in South Eastern Europe in their
efforts to foster peace, democracy,
respect for human rights and economic
prosperity, in order to achieve stability in
the whole region. On the other hand, if
Slovenia was invited earlier to start the
negotiation of EU accession and was
closely assisted by the EU, after 1999,
Bulgaria and Romania were also invited
to start negotiations and now they have
few chapters left in order to finish the
negotiation and, most probably, will be
invited to join the EU in 2007. However,
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the chief of the General Staff presented a
rather pessimistic evaluation of the RAFs
state of readiness in the year 2000, for
example. They concluded that the mili-
tary remained unprepared and poorly
trained, mainly because of lack of
resources. 
One can see that if the reform process
was triggered by the internal forces, the
guidance and Òknow-howÓ have been pro-
vided by Western institutions. However, a
trans-Atlantic rift will make the situation
in Romania and Bulgaria more difficult
since those countries see the West as a
prosperous and united actor.
In conclusion, further development of
the civil-military patterns described above
would be achieved by the SEE within
NATO. The democratization of civil-mili-
tary relations is a continuous process that
will be perfected. As some recent studies
showed, a Òsecond-generation problemat-
icÓ approach raised the problems of effi-
cient governance and global security poli-
cy.xl
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of return to their Western identity and a
more prosperous club. 
However, transatlantic disputes started
in 2002 as an academic debate, triggered
by KaganÕs article on ÒMars and
VenusÓxxxvii. The eventual dispute over the
policy on Iraq, in the early 2003, and
RumsfeldÕs words on ÒoldÓ and ÒnewÓ
Europe are just a frivolous definition of
some deep transatlantic rift that might
reveal a new geopolitical struggle for the
global power. A statement of the 10th
candidate countries to NATO, supported
somehow by the US Committee on NATO
triggered the anger of European leaders
such as Jacqes Chirac, who bluntly told
countries like Bulgaria and Romania that
Òif they wanted to find a way to reduce
their chances to enter Europe, they could
not have found a better wayÓxxxviii. ChiracÕs
words expressed the West European con-
cern that countries, such as Romania and
Bulgaria could be used by the US as a
Trojan Horse to undermine the process
of building a powerful EU. Although the
dispute didnÕt end but only attenuated, it
has created a deep concern for countries
such as Bulgaria and Romania, that con-
sider the rift will endanger their strategic
goals of integration into Western struc-
tures.
Conclusion
It can be stated from the data above
that a civilian democratic control of
Armed Forces has been put into place in
Southeastern Europe. Invitation of all
three countries to NATO is an indicator
that the pre-conditions of the ÒStudy of
NATO EnlargementÓ were accomplished. 
The geography and history of these
three countries have had many similari-
ties and the process of institutionaliza-
tion of CDC followed its own similarities.
The immediate historical legacy matters,
but in different ways. While Bulgaria and
Romania have had large armies and the
professionalization meant the (re)inven-
tion of new missions, streamlining the
military organization and getting off the
redundant personnel, or finding civilians
with strategic thinking, for Slovenia  the
main problem was how to build from
scratch a military organization and to
recruit personnel. The legal framework
has been put in place relatively in a simi-
lar way and timeline. In this respect, the
new security environment (globalization)
played an important role in fostering the
change. There were not only new asym-
metric threats but also opportunities that
pushed towards cooperative security.
NATO and its PfP program acted more
like a carrot. It was not until 1997, when
Jeffrey Simonxxxix from NDU evaluated
Bulgarian reforms as being Òseven years
lossÓ and Madrid rejection that offered a
new impetus to Southeast European
reforms.
The first 14 years were more difficult
for the SEE countries with a lot of crises
happening there. Even Slovenia, consid-
ered as being a country more advanced in
political reform sector, had its own crisis,
created by the former defense minister
Janez Jansa (1990-1994) who left 4 polit-
ical parties from left to right wing and
who filled the superior structures of MoD
with loyalists to his political party,
deprived the President and the
Commander-in-Chief of confidential
information and set up a commando unit
to conduct clandestine operations. In
Romania, the Minister of Defense and
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